

## **Treasury Management and Annual Investment Strategy 2021/22**

### **1 Introduction**

#### **1.1 Treasury management is defined as:**

‘The management of the local authority’s borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks’.

#### **1.2 The strategy covers:**

- Statutory and regulatory requirements
- Balanced budget requirement
- Prudential and treasury Indicators
- Borrowing requirement
- Current treasury position
- Prospects for interest rates
- Investment policy
- Creditworthiness policy
- Country, counterparty and group exposure limits
- Cash flow and core fund investment
- Medium and long term investment
- Year end investment report
- Policy on use of external service providers.

### **2 Statutory and regulatory requirements**

- 2.1 The Local Government Act 2003 (the Act) and supporting regulations requires the Council to ‘have regard to’ the Chartered Institute of Public Finance (CIPFA) Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice to set Prudential and Treasury Indicators for the next three years to ensure that the Council’s capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.
- 2.2 The Act requires the Council to set out its Treasury Management Strategy for borrowing and to prepare an Annual Investment Strategy

which sets out the Council's policies for managing its investments and for giving priority to the **security** and **liquidity** of those investments.

- 2.3 The Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) issued revised Statutory Guidance on Local Government Investments (2018 Edition). CIPFA also amended the Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities (2017 Edition) and the Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross Sectorial Guidance Notes (2017 Edition). The MHCLG and CIPFA Codes came into effect on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2018.
- 2.4 Historically the scope of the statutory guidance and CIPFA codes was limited to the investment of an authority's cash surpluses and the management of borrowing undertaken to support its capital expenditure plans. The updated statutory guidance and codes broaden that scope to include expenditure on loans and the acquisition of non-financial assets (property) intended to generate a profit. The Council has not engaged in any commercial investments and has no material non-treasury investments.
- 2.5 The Council formally adopted the revised CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice (2017 Edition) on 30 October 2018. The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:
  - Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
  - Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
  - Receipt by the full Council of an Annual Treasury Management Strategy, including the Annual Investment Strategy, for the year ahead; a mid-year Review Report; and an Annual Report (stewardship report) covering activities during the previous year.
  - Delegation by the Council of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
  - Delegation by the Council of the role of scrutiny of the Treasury Management Strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Council the delegated body is the Audit Committee.
- 2.6 The scheme of delegation and role of the Section 151 officer that give effect to these requirements are set out at **[Appendix 1]**.

### 3 **Balanced budget requirement**

3.1 It is a statutory requirement under Section 33 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, for the Council to produce a balanced budget. In particular, Section 32 requires a local authority to calculate its budget requirement for each financial year to include the revenue costs that flow from capital financing decisions. This means that increases in capital expenditure must be limited to a level whereby increases in charges to revenue from:

- increases in interest charges caused by increased borrowing to finance additional capital expenditure, and
- any increases in running costs from new capital projects are limited to a level which is affordable within the projected income of the Council for the foreseeable future.

### 4 **Prudential and treasury indicators**

4.1 It is a statutory duty under Section 3 of the Act and supporting regulations, for the Council to determine and keep under review how much it can afford to borrow. The amount so determined is termed the 'Affordable Borrowing Limit'. In England and Wales the Authorised Limit represents the legislative limit specified in the Act.

4.2 The Council must have regard to the Prudential Code when setting the 'Authorised Limit', which essentially requires it to ensure that total capital investment remains within sustainable limits and, in particular, that the impact upon its future council tax levels is 'acceptable'.

4.3 Whilst termed an 'Affordable Borrowing Limit', the capital plans to be considered for inclusion may incorporate financing by both external borrowing and other forms of liability, such as credit arrangements. The 'Authorised Limit' is to be set, on a rolling basis, for the forthcoming financial year and two successive financial years.

4.4 Prudential and Treasury Indicators relevant to setting an integrated treasury management strategy are set out in **[Appendix 2]**.

### 5 **Borrowing requirement**

5.1 Other than for cash flow purposes and then within the limits set out at **[Appendix 2]** borrowing will not be necessary. All capital expenditure prior to 2027/28 is expected to be funded from the Revenue Reserve for Capital Schemes, grants, developer contributions and capital receipts arising from the sale of assets. This does not however,

preclude a decision to borrow in order to fund in full or in part a capital investment opportunity that meets the Council's strategic priorities and objectives, achieves value for money and delivers a financial return. Each such opportunity to be considered on a case by case basis as appropriate.

- 5.2 The borrowing of monies purely to invest or on-lend and make a return is unlawful and this Council will not engage in such activity.

## **6 Current treasury position**

- 6.1 The Council is debt free and as such the overall treasury position at 31 December 2020 comprised only investments. On that date the Council's cash flow and core fund investments totaled £46m and was invested in a mix of money market funds, bank notice accounts and time deposits with banks and building societies. The average duration to maturity of the portfolio was 55 days with a weighted average rate of return 0.22%. Returns in future years are expected to improve as Bank Rate rises. Income from investments forms part of the Council's ten year medium term financial strategy (MTFS). An updated MTFS will be presented to Council in February 2021.
- 6.2 The Council also held £5m in externally managed property fund investments at 31 December 2020. The property funds are expected to generate income of 3.1% in 2020/21 rising to 4% in future years. Overtime, the rise in the value of each property funds' assets (capital appreciation) is expected to negate fund entry and exit costs.
- 6.3 At present the Council has no material non-treasury investments (e.g. directly owned commercial property, shares in subsidiaries or loans to third parties). The procedures, practices and governance arrangements to enable the Council to meet the requirements of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy's Treasury Management and Prudential Codes of Practice 2017 and the 2018 Statutory Guidance on Local Government Investments relating to non-treasury investments are referred to in the reports to Audit Committee 1 October 2018 and 20 January 2020. The Audit Committee report of 18 January 2021 seeks endorsement by Council of appropriate Non-treasury Management Practices.

## **7 Prospects for interest rates**

- 7.1 The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as treasury advisor to the Council and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Link's current interest rate forecast is provided

at **[Appendix 3]**. Link's expectation for Bank Rate, for each financial year ending March, are:

- 2021/ 2022 0.10%
- 2022/ 2023 0.10%
- 2023/ 2024 0.10%

7.2 The above forecast anticipated a trade deal would be agreed with the EU. The forecast may be overly optimistic (downside risks) dependent on:

- Further national lockdowns or severe regional restriction in major conurbations during 2021.
- Government takes too much action too quickly to raise taxation or introduce austerity measures that depress demand in the economy.
- Bank of England takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than currently anticipated.

7.3 The forecast may be overly pessimistic (upside risk) dependent on:

- Inflationary pressures rise faster than expected caused by a stronger than currently expected economic recovery following a programme of vaccination.
- The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a rapid series of increases in Bank Rate to stifle inflation.

7.4 Link's more detailed view of the current economic background is included at **[Appendix 4]**.

## **8 Investment policy**

8.1 The Council's investment policy has regard to the MHCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments and the CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes. The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, and then yield.

8.2 In accordance with the above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly

creditworthy counterparties. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

- 8.3 Ratings are not the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment also takes account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council engages with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as 'credit default swaps' and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.
- 8.4 Other information sources used includes the financial press, share price and other information relating to the banking sector in order to establish a robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.
- 8.5 Investment instruments identified for use are listed in **[Appendix 5]** under 'specified' and 'non-specified' investment categories. Counterparty limits are detailed in section 10 below.

## **9 Creditworthiness policy**

- 9.1 The creditworthiness service provided by Link has been progressively enhanced over the last few years and now employs a sophisticated modelling approach using credit ratings from each of the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings are supplemented using the following overlays:
- Credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
  - Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings; and
  - Sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.
- 9.2 This modelling approach combines credit ratings, and any assigned credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads. The end product is a series of colour code bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour coded bands are also used by the Council to inform the duration of an investment and are therefore referred to as durational bands. The Council is satisfied that this service now gives a much improved level of security for its investments.

- 9.3 The selection of counterparties with a high level of creditworthiness is achieved by selecting institutions down to a minimum durational band within Link's weekly credit list of potential counterparties (worldwide). Subject to an appropriate sovereign and counterparty rating the Council uses counterparties within the following durational bands:

Yellow/Pink	5 years
Purple	2 years
Blue	1 year (UK nationalised Banks)
Orange	1 year
Red	6 months
Green	100 Days

- 9.4 The Council does not use the approach suggested by CIPFA of using the lowest rating from all three rating agencies to determine creditworthy counterparties. Moody's tends to be more aggressive in giving low ratings than the other two agencies and adopting the CIPFA approach may leave the Council with too few banks on its approved lending list. The Link creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and in combination with a risk weighted scoring system undue preponderance is not given to any one agency's ratings.

- 9.5 All credit ratings are reviewed weekly and monitored on a daily basis. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link creditworthiness service.

- If a downgrade results in the counterparty no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria its use for new investment is withdrawn immediately.
- In addition to the use of credit ratings the Council is advised of movements in Credit Default Swap data against the iTraxx European Financials benchmark and other market data on a daily basis. Extreme market movements may result in a scaling back of the duration assessment or removal from the Councils lending list altogether.

- 9.6 Sole reliance is not placed on the use of the Link service. In addition the Council uses market information including information on any external support for banks to assist the decision making process.

## **10 Country, counterparty and group exposure limits**

- 10.1 The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from the UK subject to a minimum sovereign credit rating of A- and from other countries subject to a minimum sovereign

credit rating of AA-. The minimum will be the lowest rating determined by Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in **[Appendix 6]**. The list will be amended in accordance with this policy should ratings change.

- 10.2 Avoidance of a concentration of investments in too few counterparties or countries is a key to effective diversification and in this regard the limits set out below are thought to achieve a prudent balance between risk and practicality.

<b>Country, Counterparty and Group exposure</b>	<b>Maximum Proportion of Portfolio</b>
UK regulated institutions subject to UK Sovereign rating of A- or higher and the institution limits detailed below.	100%
Non-UK regulated institutions as an amount per sovereign rated AA- or higher and subject to the institution limits detailed below.	20%
Group of related institutions.	20%
Each financial institution rated Fitch A-, F1 or higher (green excluding CDS using Link's credit methodology) <b>or each local authority</b> .	20%
Each UK nationalised bank rated Fitch BBB, F2 or higher (green excluding CDS using Link's credit methodology).	20%
Each AAA rated multilateral / supranational bank.	20%
Each AAA rated CNAV, LVNAV or VNAV money market fund.	20%
Each <b>AA</b> or higher rated enhanced cash fund / government liquidity fund / gilt fund / <b>ultra-short dated bond</b> fund subject to a maximum 20% exposure to all such funds.	10%
<b>Each housing association rated Fitch A- or higher and 20% for all housing association investment</b>	<b>10%</b>
Non-specified investments over 1 year duration.	60%
Each non-rated property fund used for long term investment subject to a maximum £3m (20% of expected long term balances) per fund and across all such funds. No cash limit applies to new resources made available from, or in anticipation of, the sale of existing property assets or other windfalls.	N/A
Each non-rated diversified income (multi-asset) fund <b>and or short dated bond fund</b> used for medium term investment subject to a maximum £3m (20% of expected long term balances) per fund and across all such funds.	N/A



- 10.3 Cash flow balances vary depending on the timing of receipts and payments during the month and from month to month. The investment limits identified in paragraph 10.2 will be based on an estimate of the expected average daily cash flow balance at the start of the financial year augmented by core cash and other balances. Counterparty investments will be managed to ensure compliance with the limits at the start and end of each financial year when balances available for investment will be at a low point.

## **11 Cash flow and core fund investment**

- 11.1 Funds available for investment are split between cash flow and core cash. Cash flow funds are generated from the collection of council tax, business rates and other income streams. They are consumed during the financial year to meet payments to precept authorities and government (NNDR contributions) and to meet service delivery costs (benefit payments, staff salaries and suppliers in general). The consumption of cash flow funds during the course of a financial year places a natural limit on the maximum duration of investments (up to one year). Core funds comprise monies set aside in the Council's revenue and capital reserves and are generally available to invest for durations in excess of one year.
- 11.2 **Cash flow investments.** The average daily cash flow balance throughout 2021/22 is expected to be £15.5m with a proportion available for longer than three months. Cash flow investments will be made with reference to cash flow requirements (liquidity) and the outlook for short-term interest rates i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months. Liquidity will be maintained by using bank deposit accounts and money markets funds. Where duration can be tolerated, additional yield will be generated by utilising term deposits with banks and building societies and enhanced cash and government liquidity funds. Investment in ultra-short dated bond funds will also be considered. Cash balances available for more than 3 months may be transferred to the core fund portfolio if a better overall return for the Council can be achieved by doing so.
- 11.3 In compiling the Council's estimates for 2021/22 a return on cash flow investments of 0.20% has been assumed.
- 11.4 **Core fund investments.** Historically the Council's core funds have been managed by an external fund manager. All core funds were returned to the Council for in-house management during 2014/15. The core fund balance is diminishing as a proportion is consumed each

year (approximately £2m per annum) to support the Council's revenue budget and capital expenditure plans. The average core fund balance during 2021/22 is expected to be £14m.

- 11.5 The Council will avoid locking into longer term deals while investment rates continue their current low levels unless attractive rates are available with counterparties of particularly high creditworthiness which make longer term deals worthwhile and are within the risk parameters set by the Council.
- 11.6 In compiling the Council's estimates for 2021/22 a return on core fund investments of 0.35% has been assumed. Subject to the credit quality and exposure limits outlined in paragraph 10.2, liquidity and yield will be achieved by a mix of investments using predominantly fixed term deposits and certificates of deposit. Notice accounts, enhanced cash and government liquidity funds and ultra-short dated bond funds will also be used if these offer favourable returns relative to term deposits. Investment with housing associations and other local authorities will also be considered.

## **12 Medium and long term investment.**

- 12.1 The strategy includes provision (paragraph 10.2 and detailed in Appendix 5) to undertake medium term investment in either short dated bond funds and or diversified income funds (a mix of cash, bonds, equity and property) through externally managed collective investment schemes. Investment in such schemes typically implies a three to five year commitment to recoup entry and exit fees and mitigate the potential for a fall in the value of assets under management.
- 12.2 A detailed evaluation of a funds asset quality, market risk, redemption constraints, management and governance arrangements will be undertaken in advance of any investment taking place. Support to identify and select the most appropriate fund(s) will be sought from the Council's treasury advisor. Any sums invested will be reported at regular intervals with income received and changes in capital value separately identified. The strategy places an upper limit on exposure to such funds of 20% of expected long term cash balances, circa £3m.
- 12.3 The strategy includes provision (paragraph 10.2 and detailed in Appendix 5) to undertake long term investment in property through an externally managed collective investment scheme (fund). Investment in such schemes typically implies a 10 year commitment to recoup entry and exit fees. To mitigate the risk that capital values may fall due to changes in economic activity, investment duration cannot be determined with certainty at the time the investment commences. As a

consequence any cash balances applied to such an investment must be available for the long term and there must be flexibility over the timing of redemption(s) in the future. Sums invested will be reported at regular intervals with income received and changes in capital value separately identified. The strategy places an upper limit on exposure to such funds from existing resources of 20% of expected long term cash balances, circa £3m. No limit applies to new resources made available from the sale of existing assets or other windfalls.

### **13 Year end investment report**

- 13.1 At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

### **14 Policy on the use of external service providers**

- 14.1 The Council uses Link Asset Services as its external treasury management advisors.
- 14.2 The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the Council at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.
- 14.3 It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

## **Financial Services January 2021**

### **Appendices**

1. Treasury management scheme of delegation
2. Prudential and treasury indicators
3. Interest rate forecasts
4. Economic background provided by Link Asset Services
5. Credit and counterparty risk management (TMP1)
6. Approved countries for investments

## **Appendix 1 Treasury management scheme of delegation**

### **Full Council**

- Budget approval.
- Approval of treasury management policy.
- Approval of the annual treasury management and investment strategy.
- Approval of amendments to the Council's adopted clauses, treasury management policy and annual treasury management and investment strategy.
- Approval of the treasury management outturn and mid-year reports.

### **Cabinet**

- Budget consideration.
- Approval of the division of responsibilities.
- Approval of the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.
- Acting on recommendations in connection with monitoring reports.

### **Audit Committee**

- Reviewing the annual treasury management and investment strategy and making recommendations to Cabinet and Council.
- Receive reports on treasury activity at regular intervals during the year and making recommendations to Cabinet.
- Reviewing treasury management policy, practices and procedures and making recommendations to Cabinet and Council.

### **Finance, Innovation and Property Advisory Board**

- Receiving budgetary control reports at regular intervals that include treasury management performance.

### **The S151 (responsible) officer**

- Recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance.
- Submitting regular treasury management policy reports.
- Submitting budgets and budget variations.
- Receiving and reviewing management information reports.
- Reviewing the performance of the treasury management function.
- Ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function.
- Prepare and maintain effective treasury management practices (TMPs).
- Ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit.
- Recommending the appointment of external service providers.
- Preparation of a Capital Strategy and for ensuring the strategy is sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and that due diligence has been carried out to support each investment decision and those decisions are in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority.

## Appendix 2 Prudential and treasury indicators

The prudential indicators relating to capital expenditure cannot be set until the capital programme is finally determined and will as a consequence be reported as part of the Setting the Budget for 2021/22 report that is to be submitted to Cabinet on 11 February 2021.

The treasury management indicators are as set out in the table below:

TREASURY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24
	Actual	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Authorised Limit for external debt :					
borrowing	nil	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000
other long term liabilities	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil
TOTAL	nil	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000
Operational Boundary for external debt:-					
borrowing	nil	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
other long term liabilities	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil
TOTAL	nil	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
Actual external debt	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure > 1 year at year end	nil	It is anticipated that exposure will range between 0% to 60%			
Upper limit for variable rate exposure < 1 year at year end	19,610 (49.5%)	It is anticipated that exposure will range between 40% to 100%			
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over 365 days at year end	5,000 (12.6%)	60% of funds			

Maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing during 2020/21 - 2023/24	upper limit	lower limit
under 12 months	100 %	0 %
Over 12 months	0 %	0 %

## Appendix 3 Interest rate forecasts – November 2020

Link Group Interest Rate View		9.11.20		(The Capital Economics forecasts were done 11.11.20)										
These Link forecasts have been amended for the reduction in PWLB margins by 1.0% from 26.11.20														
	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
10 yr PWLB	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
25 yr PWLB	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80
50 yr PWLB	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
Bank Rate														
Link	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
Capital Economics	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	-	-	-	-	-
5yr PWLB Rate														
Link	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Capital Economics	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	-	-	-	-	-
10yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
Capital Economics	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	-	-	-	-	-
25yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80
Capital Economics	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	-	-	-	-	-
50yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
Capital Economics	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	-	-	-	-	-

## Appendix 4      Economic background based on text provided by Link Asset Services


- 1      **UK.** The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee kept **Bank Rate** unchanged on 5th November. However, it revised its economic forecasts to take account of a second national lockdown from 5th November to 2nd December which is obviously going to put back economic recovery and do further damage to the economy. It therefore decided to do a further tranche of **quantitative easing (QE) of £150bn**, to start in January when the current programme of £300bn of QE announced in March to June, runs out. It did this so that "announcing further asset purchases now should support the economy and help to ensure the unavoidable near-term slowdown in activity was not amplified by a tightening in monetary conditions that could slow the return of inflation to the target".
  
- 2      Its forecasts appeared, at the time, to be rather optimistic in terms of three areas:
  - The economy would recover to reach its pre-pandemic level in Q1 2022
  - The Bank also expects there to be excess demand in the economy by Q4 2022.
  - CPI inflation is therefore projected to be above the 2% target by the start of 2023 and the "inflation risks were judged to be balanced".
  
- 3      Significantly, there was no mention of **negative interest rates** in the minutes or Monetary Policy Report, suggesting that the MPC remains some way from being persuaded of the case for such a policy, at least for the next 6 -12 months. However, rather than saying that it "stands ready to adjust monetary policy", the MPC this time said that it will take "whatever additional action was necessary to achieve its remit". The latter seems stronger and wider and may indicate the Bank's willingness to embrace new tools.
  
- 4      One key addition to the **Bank's forward guidance** in August was a new phrase in the policy statement, namely that "it does not intend to tighten monetary policy until there is clear evidence that significant progress is being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2% target sustainably". That seems designed to say, in effect, that even if inflation rises to 2% in a couple of years' time, do not expect any action from the MPC to raise Bank Rate – until they can clearly see that level of inflation is going to be persistently above target if it takes no action to raise Bank Rate. Our Bank Rate forecast currently shows no increase through to quarter 1 2024 but there could well be no increase during the next five years due to the slow rate of recovery of the economy and the need for the Government to see the burden of the elevated debt to GDP ratio falling significantly. **Inflation** is unlikely to pose a threat requiring increases in Bank Rate during this period as there is likely to be spare capacity in the economy for a considerable time. It is expected to briefly peak at around 2% towards the end of 2021, but this is a temporary short lived factor and so not a concern.

- 5 However, the minutes did contain several references to **downside risks**. The MPC reiterated that the “recovery would take time, and the risks around the GDP projection were judged to be skewed to the downside”. It also said “the risk of a more persistent period of elevated unemployment remained material”. Downside risks could well include severe restrictions remaining in place in some form during the rest of December and most of January too. That could involve some or all of the lockdown being extended beyond 2nd December, a temporary relaxation of restrictions over Christmas, a resumption of the lockdown in January and lots of regions being subject to Tier 3 restrictions when the lockdown ends. Hopefully, restrictions should progressively ease during the spring. It is only to be expected that some businesses that have barely survived the first lockdown, will fail to survive the second lockdown, especially those businesses that depend on a surge of business in the run up to Christmas each year. This will mean that there will be some level of further permanent loss of economic activity, although the extension of the furlough scheme to the end of 31st March will limit the degree of damage done.
  
- 6 As for **upside risks**, we have been waiting expectantly for news that various **Covid-19 vaccines** would be cleared as being safe and effective for administering to the general public. The Pfizer announcement on 9th November was very encouraging as its 90% effectiveness was much higher than the 50-60% rate of effectiveness of flu vaccines which might otherwise have been expected. However, their phase three trials are still only two-thirds complete. More data needs to be collected to make sure there are no serious side effects. We don’t know exactly how long immunity will last or whether it is effective across all age groups. The Pfizer vaccine specifically also has demanding cold storage requirements of minus 70C that might make it more difficult to roll out. However, the logistics of production and deployment can surely be worked out over the next few months.
  
- 7 However, there has been even further encouraging news since then with another two vaccines announcing high success rates. Together, these three announcements have enormously boosted confidence that **life could largely return to normal during the second half of 2021**, with activity in the still-depressed sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels returning to their pre-pandemic levels, which would help to bring the unemployment rate down. With the household saving rate currently being exceptionally high, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for these services. A comprehensive roll-out of vaccines might take into late 2021 to fully complete; but if these vaccines prove to be highly effective, then there is a possibility that restrictions could begin to be eased, possibly in Q2 2021, once vulnerable people and front-line workers had been vaccinated. At that point, there would be less reason to fear that hospitals could become overwhelmed any more. Effective vaccines would radically improve the economic outlook once they have been widely administered; it may allow GDP to rise to its pre-virus level a year earlier than otherwise and mean that the unemployment rate peaks at 7% next year instead of 9%. But while this would reduce the need for more QE and/or negative interest rates, increases in Bank Rate would still remain some years away. There is also a potential question as to whether the relatively optimistic outlook of the Monetary Policy Report was swayed by




making positive assumptions around effective vaccines being available soon. It should also be borne in mind that as effective vaccines will take time to administer, economic news could well get worse before it starts getting better.

- 8 **Public borrowing** is now forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) to reach £394bn in the current financial year, the highest ever peace time deficit and equivalent to 19% of GDP. In normal times, such an increase in total gilt issuance would lead to a rise in gilt yields, and so PWLB rates. However, the QE done by the Bank of England has depressed gilt yields to historic low levels, (as has similarly occurred with QE and debt issued in the US, the EU and Japan). This means that new UK debt being issued, and this is being done across the whole yield curve in all maturities, is locking in those historic low levels through until maturity. In addition, the UK has one of the longest average maturities for its entire debt portfolio, of any country in the world. Overall, this means that the total interest bill paid by the Government is manageable despite the huge increase in the total amount of debt. The OBR was also forecasting that the government will still be running a budget deficit of £102bn (3.9% of GDP) by 2025/26. However, initial impressions are that they have taken a pessimistic view of the impact that vaccines could make in the speed of economic recovery.
  
- 9 Overall, **the pace of recovery** was not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. The initial recovery was sharp but after a disappointing increase in GDP of only 2.1% in August, this left the economy still 9.2% smaller than in February; this suggested that the economic recovery was running out of steam after recovering 64% of its total fall during the crisis. The last three months of 2020 were originally expected to show zero growth due to the impact of widespread local lockdowns, consumers probably remaining cautious in spending, and uncertainty over the outcome of the UK/EU trade negotiations concluding at the end of the year also being a headwind. However, the second national lockdown starting on 5th November for one month is expected to depress GDP by 8% in November while the rebound in December is likely to be muted and vulnerable to the previously mentioned downside risks. It was expected that the second national lockdown would push back recovery of GDP to pre pandemic levels by six months and into sometime during 2023. However, the graph below shows what Capital Economics forecast will happen now that there is high confidence that successful vaccines will be widely administered in the UK in the first half of 2021; this would cause a much quicker recovery than in their previous forecasts.




- 10 This recovery of growth which eliminates the effects of the pandemic by about the middle of the decade would have major repercussions for public finances as it would be consistent with the government deficit falling to 2% of GDP without any tax increases. This would be in line with the OBR's most optimistic forecast in the graph below, rather than their current central scenario which predicts a 4% deficit due to assuming much slower growth. However, Capital Economics forecasts assume that there is a reasonable Brexit deal and also that politicians do not raise taxes or embark on major austerity measures and so, perversely, depress economic growth and recovery.



- 11 Capital Economics have not revised their forecasts for Bank Rate or gilt yields after this major revision of their forecasts for the speed of recovery of economic growth, as they are also forecasting that inflation is unlikely to be a significant threat and so gilt yields are unlikely to rise significantly from current levels.
- 12 There will still be some **painful longer term adjustments** as e.g. office space and travel by planes, trains and buses may not recover to their previous level of use for several years, or possibly ever, even if vaccines are fully successful in overcoming the current virus. There is also likely to be a reversal of globalisation as this crisis has exposed how vulnerable long-distance supply chains are. On the other hand, digital services are one area that has already seen huge growth.
- 13 The **Financial Policy Committee** (FPC) report on 6th August revised down their expected credit losses for the banking sector to “somewhat less than £80bn”. It stated that in its assessment “banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC’s central projection”. The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC’s projection, with unemployment rising to above 15%.
- 14 **US.** The result of **the November elections** means that while the Democrats have gained the presidency and a majority in the House of Representatives, it looks as if the Republicans will retain their slim majority in the Senate. This means that the Democrats will not be able to do a massive fiscal stimulus, as they had been hoping to do after the elections, as they will have to get agreement from the Republicans. That would have resulted in another surge of debt issuance and could have put particular upward pressure on debt yields – which could then have also put upward pressure on gilt yields. On the other hand, equity prices leapt up on 9th November on the first news of a successful vaccine and have risen further during November as more vaccines announced successful results. This could cause a big shift in investor sentiment i.e. a swing to sell out of government debt to buy into equities which would normally be expected to cause debt prices to fall and yields to rise. However, the rise in yields has been quite muted so far and it is too early to say whether the Fed would feel it necessary to take action to suppress any further rise in debt yields. It is likely that the next two years, and possibly four years in the US, could be a political stalemate where neither party can do anything radical.
- 15 The economy had been recovering quite strongly from its contraction in 2020 of 10.2% due to the **pandemic** with GDP only 3.5% below its pre-pandemic level and the unemployment rate dropping below 7%. However, the rise in new cases during quarter 4, to the highest level since mid-August, suggests that the US could be in the early stages of a third wave. While the first wave in March and April was concentrated in the Northeast, and the second wave in the South and West, the latest wave has been driven by a growing outbreak in the Midwest. The latest upturn poses a threat that the recovery in the economy could stall. This is **the single biggest downside risk** to the shorter

term outlook – a more widespread and severe wave of infections over the winter months, which is compounded by the impact of the regular flu season and, as a consequence, threatens to overwhelm health care facilities. Under those circumstances, states might feel it necessary to return to more draconian lockdowns.

Covid-19 New infections & hospitalisations



- 16 However, with the likelihood that highly effective vaccines are going to become progressively widely administered during 2021, this should mean that life will start to return to normal during quarter 2 of 2021. Consequently, there should be a sharp pick-up in growth during that quarter and a rapid return to the pre-pandemic level of growth by the end of the year.
- 17 After Chair Jerome Powell unveiled the **Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target** in his Jackson Hole speech in late August, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed by a majority to a toned down version of the new inflation target in his speech - that "it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2% and was on track to moderately exceed 2% for some time." This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has actually been under-shooting the 2% target significantly for most of the last decade, (and this year), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. The Fed also called on Congress to end its political disagreement over providing more support for the unemployed as there is a limit to what monetary policy can do compared to more directed central government fiscal policy. The FOMC's updated economic and rate projections in mid-September showed that officials expect to leave the fed funds rate at near-zero until at least end-2023 and probably for another year

or two beyond that. There is now some expectation that where the Fed has led in changing its inflation target, other major central banks will follow. The increase in tension over the last year between the US and China is likely to lead to a lack of momentum in progressing the initial positive moves to agree a phase one trade deal. The Fed's meeting on 5 November was unremarkable - but at a politically sensitive time around the elections.

- 18 **EU.** The economy was recovering well towards the end of Q2 and into Q3 after a sharp drop in GDP caused by the virus, (e.g. France 18.9%, Italy 17.6%). However, growth is likely to stagnate during Q4, and Q1 of 2021, as a second wave of the virus has affected many countries, and is likely to hit hardest those countries more dependent on tourism. The €750bn fiscal support package eventually agreed by the EU after prolonged disagreement between various countries, is unlikely to provide significant support, and quickly enough, to make an appreciable difference in the worst affected countries. With inflation expected to be unlikely to get much above 1% over the next two years, the ECB has been struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target. It is currently unlikely that it will cut its central rate even further into negative territory from -0.5%, although the ECB has stated that it retains this as a possible tool to use. It is therefore expected that it will have to provide more monetary policy support through more quantitative easing purchases of bonds in the absence of sufficient fiscal support from governments. The current PEPP scheme of €1,350bn of QE which started in March 2020 is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy. There is therefore unlikely to be a euro crisis while the ECB is able to maintain this level of support. However, the PEPP scheme is regarded as being a temporary measure during this crisis so it may need to be increased once the first PEPP runs out during early 2021. It could also decide to focus on using the Asset Purchase Programme to make more monthly purchases, rather than the PEPP scheme, and it does have other monetary policy options.
- 19 However, as in the UK and the US, the advent of highly effective vaccines will be a game changer, although growth will struggle during the closing and opening quarters of this year and next year respectively before it finally breaks through into strong growth in quarters 2 and 3. The ECB will now have to review whether more monetary support will be required to help recovery in the shorter term or to help individual countries more badly impacted by the pandemic.
- 20 **China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1, economic recovery was strong in Q2 and then into Q3 and Q4; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy has benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors help to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies.
- 21 However, this was achieved by major central government funding of yet more infrastructure spending. After years of growth having been focused on this



same area, any further spending in this area is likely to lead to increasingly weaker economic returns in the longer term. This could, therefore, lead to a further misallocation of resources which will weigh on growth in future years.

- 22 **Japan.** Japan's success in containing the virus without imposing draconian restrictions on activity should enable a faster return to pre-virus levels of output than in many major economies. While the second wave of the virus has been abating, the economy has been continuing to recover at a reasonable pace from its earlier total contraction of 8.5% in GDP. However, there now appears to be the early stages of the start of a third wave. It has also been struggling to get out of a deflation trap for many years and to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. There has also been little progress on fundamental reform of the economy. The change of Prime Minister is not expected to result in any significant change in economic policy.
- 23 **World growth.** While Latin America and India have, until recently, been hotspots for virus infections, infection rates have begun to stabilise. World growth will be in recession this year. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus crisis.
- 24 Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation.

## Summary

- 25 **Central banks are, therefore, likely to support growth by maintaining loose monetary policy through keeping rates very low for longer.**

**Governments could also help a quicker recovery by providing more fiscal support for their economies at a time when total debt is affordable due to the very low rates of interest. They will also need to avoid significant increases in taxation or austerity measures that depress demand in their economies.**

- 26 If there is a huge surge in investor confidence as a result of successful vaccines which leads to a major switch out of government bonds into equities, which, in turn, causes government debt yields to rise, then there will be pressure on central banks to actively manage debt yields by further QE purchases of government debt; this would help to suppress the rise in debt yields and so keep the total interest bill on greatly expanded government debt portfolios within manageable parameters. It is also the main alternative to a programme of austerity.**

Link Asset Services  
01 December 2020

## Appendix 5 Credit and counterparty risk management (TMP1)

All specified and non-specified Investments will be:

Subject to the sovereign, counterparty and group exposure limits identified in the Annual Investment Strategy (Section 10).

Subject to the duration limit **where applicable** suggested by Link (+6 months for UK institutions) at the time each investment is placed.

Subject to a maximum of 60% of funds being held in non-specified investments at any one time.

Sterling denominated.

### Specified Investments (maturities up to 1 year):

investment	Minimum Credit Criteria
UK Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility	UK Sovereign A-
Term deposits - UK local authorities	UK Sovereign A-
Term deposits - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB, F2 or Green excluding CDS
Term deposits – all other banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 or Green excluding CDS
Certificates of deposit - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB, F2 or Green excluding CDS
Certificates of deposit – all other banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1, or Green excluding CDS
UK Treasury Bills	UK Sovereign A-
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign A-
Bonds issued by multi-lateral development banks	AAA
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK Gov't)	AAA
Money market funds (CNAV, LVNAV or VNAV)	AAA
Enhanced cash / Government liquidity / <b>Ultra-short dated bond funds</b>	<b>AA</b>



**Non-specified Investments** (maturities in excess of 1 year and any maturity if not included above):

Investment	Minimum Credit Criteria	Max duration to maturity
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits) - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB,F2 (Green)	2 years
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits) - banks and building societies	UK sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Term deposits - local authorities	UK Sovereign A-	3 years
Term deposits - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB,F2 (Green)	2 years
Term deposits - banks, building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
<b><i>Term deposits – housing associations</i></b>	<b><i>UK Sovereign A- Counterparty A-</i></b>	<b><i>2 years</i></b>
Certificates of deposit - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB,F2 (Green)	2 years
Certificates of deposit - banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Commercial paper - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB,F2 (Green)	2 years
Commercial paper - banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Floating rate notes issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	2 years
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	2 years
Sovereign bonds (other than the UK Government)	AAA	2 years
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign A-	5 years
Property funds	N/A	N/A
Diversified income <b><i>and or short dated bond</i></b> funds	N/A	N/A

**Accounting treatment of investments.** The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

## Appendix 6      Approved countries for investments

Each financial institution must meet the minimum credit criteria specified in the Annual Investment Strategy (Section 10). For non-UK regulated institutions the institutions sovereign must be rated AA- or higher by each of the three rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's.

This list will be reviewed and amended if appropriate on a weekly basis by the Director of Finance and Transformation.

As of 31 December 2020 sovereigns meeting the above requirement which also (except for Hong Kong, Norway and Luxembourg) have banks operating in sterling markets with credit ratings of green or above on the Link Asset Services' Credit Worthiness List were:

AAA	Australia
	Denmark
	Germany
	Luxembourg
	Netherlands
	Norway
	Singapore
	Sweden
	Switzerland
AA+	Canada
	Finland
	USA
AA	Abu Dhabi (UAE)
	France
AA-	Belgium
	Hong Kong
	Qatar

At 31 December 2020 the UK received a credit rating of AA- from Fitch and Moody's and AA from Standard and Poor's.